Abstract
Introduction
A central feature of mainstream twentieth century economics is its reliance on models of individual rational decision-making. Criticism of economics usually focuses on conclusions about empirical failure of rational agent models. Much of this criticism comes from cognitive psychology or from economists with backgrounds in cognitive psychology or behavioral science. Indeed, critical discourse on rational choice models is often framed as a contest between economic theory and the falsifying evidence from cognitive psychology. An example that illustrates this point is provided by Hogarth and Reder (1987) , the published record of a conference on economics and psychology.
Authors of numerous papers on experiments with common value auctions (e.g., Thiel, 1975; Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983a,b; Kagel and Levin, 1986; Kagel, et al., 1989; Lind and Plott, 1991; Cox, Dinkin, and Swarthout, 2001 ) have reported that bidders often suffer from the winner's curse. But all of these previous experiments have involved bids decided by individuals. The implications of this research for group bidding behavior are unknown.
One reason why firms and other organizations bring several people together to decide on a bid may be their conjecture that group members have different information available about the auctioned item or, if the information is common to all group members, that it may be open to individual interpretations.
Alternatively, firms may have bids decided on by groups because of a belief that groups are more rational than individuals in the strategic environment of the common value auction. If groups have more information than individuals, and groups utilize their information no less rationally than do individuals, then it would obviously follow that group performance would be better than individual performance in auctions. But the actual relative performance of groups and individuals in common value auctions is an empirical question that we address with our experiments.
We report results from experiments designed to provide comparisons of individual and group bidding behavior. If group bidding differs from individual bidding, this could result from groups having more information or, alternatively, better or worse judgment. This distinction is examined by crossing an information density (signal sample size) treatment with the bidding entity (groups or individuals) treatment in the experimental design.
A task is defined as intellective if there is a normative criterion for evaluating the quality of a decision, and as judgmental if no such criterion exists (Laughlin, 1980; Laughlin and Ellis, 1986; McGrath, 1984) . Intellective tasks are further divided on the basis of their "demonstrability"; highly demonstrable tasks are those where the argument prescribed by the normative model is self-evidently correct (Gigone and Hastie, 1993; Laughlin and Ellis, 1986) . This leads to the prediction that groups will outperform individuals on highly demonstrable tasks (Laughlin, et al., 1976; Laughlin and Ellis, 1986; Davis, 1992) . Cason and Mui (1997) study individual and group decisions in the dictator game and explore the group polarization hypothesis (Isenberg, 1986 ) that group decision-making selects extreme rather than modal individual outcomes. Blinder and Morgan (2005) report that groups make better decisions than individuals in two macro economy "steering" tasks. Bornstein (1992) reports that groups offer less and are willing to accept less in the ultimatum game and Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) suggest that the subgame perfect equilibrium argument ("player 2 should accept any positive offer since anything is better than nothing"), when voiced, had a decisive effect on group decisions. Cooper and Kagel (forthcoming) report that two person groups play more strategically than individuals in signaling games.
Although a few of the group behavior experiments cited in the preceding paragraph involve strategic games, none involve markets. We experiment with group and individual behavior in the context of a market for which there is a quantitative measure of deviation from minimally rational decisions.
Rational Bidding in Common Value Auctions
There may be various reasons why groups have responsibility for making decisions, not the least of which is the possibility that each individual will bring some distinct information to the process. In section 3.2 we develop a formal representation of the advantage of having more information about the value of the auctioned item. But first consider the information environment commonly used in previous research on common value auctions with individual bidders.
Implications of an Individual Estimate of Value
Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction in which bidders do not know the value of the item being sold when they bid and the value v of the item is the same for all bidders. Suppose that each bidder receives an independent signal s i that provides an unbiased estimate of the item's value. The expected value of the item conditional on the bidder's signal is written as
. The expected value of the auctioned item conditional on the bidder's own signal being the highest of N signals (i.e., equal to the highest order statistic, y N ) is written as ). | (
For bids by N > 1 bidding entities, one has
by well-known properties of order statistics. Statement (1) implies that if bidders naively submit bids equal to their common value estimates then they will have an expected loss from winning the auction; that is, they will suffer from the winner's curse.
The comparison between the unconditional and conditional expected values in statement (1) can be quantified by considering the case where the common value of the auctioned item is uniformly distributed on [ , ] v v l h and each individual agent's signal is independently drawn from the uniform
. Statement (2) implies that if bidders naively submit bids equal to their common value estimates then they will have an expected loss in the amount 
With signals drawn from the uniform distribution, one has
Comparison of the right hand side of equation (2) with the second line of equation (3) 
, the same amount as in the customary single signal case (see equation (2)), because in that case S > 1 signals don't provide any more information about the value of the auctioned item than would a single signal.
The preceding analysis of the information content of signal samples shows that having S > 1 signals should make it easier to avoid the winner's curse than it is with a single signal. But bidding behavior may be inconsistent with this prediction. It is known from previous experiments with individual subjects with single signals s i that bidders do not sufficiently increase their discounts from s i as market size N increases. As a result, the winner's curse has high incidence in N = 7 treatments but not in N = 3 treatments (Kagel and Levin, 1986; Cox, Dinkin, and Swarthout, 2001 ). There may be a similar problem with variable signal sample range in multiple signal treatments. A question that can be addressed with our multiple signal treatments is whether bidders sufficiently increase their discounts from signal sample midrange as the sample range decreases so as to avoid the winner's curse in multiple signal treatments.
Further questions are concerned with the effects of interactions among market size, signal sample size, and composition of the bidding unit (individual or group).
Deviations from minimally-rational bidding can be measured by linear regressions relating winning bids to the signal sample midranges and ranges of the winning bidders, as we do in section 6. Of course, a bid may be less than
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but still higher than the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bid for the bidder's signal sample. But that would not imply that the bid is irrational unless the bidder knew that all other bidders were bidding according to the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bid function. If rival bidders are bidding above the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bid function then a bidder's rational best reply may be to also bid higher than bids specified by the equilibrium bid function. But it would never be rational to bid higher than is characterized by the winner's curse, which is not rational bidding.
Experimental Design: Signals, Bidders, and Markets
Our design crosses: (a) bidding entity composition with (b) variable signal sample with (c) variable market size. The rationale for several features of the design and protocol are as follows.
Rationale for Varying the Signal Sample Size
Group bidding may differ from individual bidding either because (a) groups are inherently more or less rational than individuals or (b) individual members of groups have distinct estimates of the value of the auctioned item. Exploration of the differences between individual and group bidding requires that one separate the effects of the composition of the bidding unit per se from the effects of signal sample size.
We cross the bidding unit composition treatment with the signal sample size treatment.
Rationale for Varying the Market Size
We also "cross" a market size treatment (3 or 7 bidding units) with the bidding unit composition and signal sample size treatments. The reason for varying the market size in this way is that previous researchers have found that once-or twice-experienced individual bidders in markets of size 3, where each individual has a signal sample size of 1, do not suffer the winner's curse whereas in markets of size 7 individual bidders with the same experience and signal information do suffer from the winner's curse so badly that most of them go bankrupt (see, for example, Kagel and Levin, 1986) . We address the following questions with our experimental design: (1) Do group bidders fare the same or differently than individual bidders in the 3-bidder and 7-bidder market sizes? (2) Does the answer to question (1) depend on whether the group bidders have the same or larger signal sample sizes than the individual bidders? (3) Do group and/or individual bidders with larger signal sample sizes fare the same or differently than they do with a signal sample size of 1 in the 3-bidder or 7-bidder market sizes?
Rationale for Using Groups Consisting of Five Subjects
Some of the literature on group behavior has questioned whether a 3 person group is large enough to elicit true "group" behavior. In order to avoid potential criticisms that we did not use large enough groups in our experiments, we need to use groups of at least size 4. Since some of our groups might try to make decisions by voting on proposals, we want to avoid a group size that is an even number so as to always admit the possibility of a decisive majority vote. We use groups of size 5.
Rationale for Using Experienced Subjects
Reports of results from previous common value auction experiments with individual bidders have focused on the behavior of experienced subjects, where "experience" means having participated in one or more previous common value auction experiments. The reason for this is that most subjects fall victim to the winner's curse in all experimental treatments when they are first-time bidders but such inexperienced behavior is not considered to be very interesting. We use subject experience as a treatment to allow comparison of our results with those in the literature.
Information and Repetition
Both individuals and groups have opportunities to learn from experience about the implications of not discounting their signal sample estimates of the common value. This will occur both within treatment sessions and between treatments at different subject experience levels. Within-session learning can occur because treatment sessions consist of at least 30 rounds of bidding with information feedback. After each round of bidding is concluded, all subjects are informed of the amount of the winning bid and the common value of the auctioned item, and therefore about the profit or loss realized by the high bidder.
Experiment Procedures
Experiment sessions with individual bidders were conducted in the Economic Science Laboratory (ESL).
Sessions with group bidders were conducted in the breakout rooms of the Decision Behavior Laboratory (DBL). ESL and DBL are adjacent laboratories in McClelland Hall at the University of Arizona. Each group or individual had its own personal computer that was connected to a local area network running customized auction software. Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student population.
Treatments were implemented in three-day sequences of two-hour sessions. Subject instructions contained a detailed description of the information environment of the common value auctions. Subjects were informed in non-technical terms that in each auction round the computer would draw a value v for the auctioned item from the discrete uniform distribution on the integers greater than or equal to 2,500 experimental dollars and less than or equal to 22,500 experimental dollars. They were informed that the common value would not be revealed but that it would be the midpoint of a uniform distribution from which their value estimates, or signals, would be independently drawn. Subjects were informed in nontechnical terms that after the computer drew a common value v for a round it would draw all signals independently from the uniform distribution on [v-1800, v+1800].
On day 1 of the three-day sequence, the inexperienced subjects first participated in 10 periods of practice auctions. After each practice auction, the subjects' computer monitors displayed the common value, all subjects' bids, and the amount won or lost by the high bidder. The subjects were each given a capital endowment of 1,000 experimental dollars in order to allow them to make at least one sizable overbid without becoming bankrupt. At the end of the practice rounds, the subjects' profits and losses were set to zero and they began the 30 monetary payoff rounds with new 1,000 experimental dollar capital endowments. The actual number of monetary-payoff rounds to be completed was not announced.
During the monetary payoff rounds the information reported at the end of each auction included only the common value and the high bid, not the bids by other bidders. We decided not to report all bids in order to make collusion difficult and to adopt procedures that correspond to minimal reporting requirements in non-laboratory auctions. The procedures were the same on day 2 as on day 1. Procedures were the same on day 3 except that only the common value and high bid (rather than all bids) were reported in the practice rounds to further inhibit any attempts at collusion by the twice-experienced subjects.
Signals were presented to the subjects on sheets of paper. In treatments with signal sample size of 1, each subject was given a single sheet of paper with signals for 10 practice rounds and 40 monetarypayoff rounds. In the group-bidding treatments with signal sample size of 1, each member of a group had a sheet of paper with signals that were identical to the signals of other members of the same group but distinct from the signals of members of other groups. In treatments with signal sample size of 5: (a) each subject in an individual bidder experiment had 5 sheets of paper with independently-drawn signals;
and (b) each subject in a group bidding experiment had 1 sheet of paper with independently-drawn signals. Since the groups each had 5 members, each group in a treatment with signal sample size 5 had access to the same information as an individual subject in the individual-bidder treatment with the same signal sample size. The groups were informed that they were free to use their signal sample sheets within their own breakout rooms during an experiment session any way that they wanted to. The experimenters collected all sheets of signals at the end of each session.
Signals, common values, and bids were denominated in experimental dollars, with a clearly specified exchange rate into U.S. dollars, for two reasons. The less important reason was that this made it easy to require that all bids be integers, thus avoiding the bid entry errors produced by subjects' having to use decimal points in their responses. The more important reason was to eliminate extraneous sources of variation across treatments. We held constant the experimental-dollar capital endowments, sequence The U.S. dollar incentives in the experiment were non-trivial. Consider for example, the group bidder treatment with market size 7 and signal sample size 1 (treatment (5, 1, 7) in section 6 and Tables   2 and 3 ). The exchange rate was 9 experimental dollars per 1 U.S. dollar. If in some auction round all bidders were to have bid naively and submitted bids equal to their signals, then the group with the high bid would have had an expected loss of 150 U.S. dollars from just this one "winning" bid.
Many inexperienced individual and group bidding entities made winning bids that turned out to be so high that they attained large negative cumulative payoffs. A nontrivial number of once-experienced and twice-experienced subjects also incurred negative balances. When a bidder's cumulative payoffs were negative at the end of a session the loss was forgiven (the bidder was permitted to "go bankrupt").
Dismissing negative balance subjects from further participation was not an option in our experiment because: (a) we needed to keep market size constant, and therefore could not simply dismiss negative balance subjects during a session; and (b) experience was a treatment, and hence we could not substitute new subjects for bankrupt ones between sessions. In the data analysis reported in section 6 we delete observations for periods within a session with negative balance bidders. Again, all bids by all bidders within a treatment session are deleted for all periods following the bankruptcy of any single bidder.
Forgiving losses between sessions did not change the bidding strategies that are rational. The only way bidders could protect against loss of their endowments, and have prospects of earning higher payoffs, was to submit bids less than zero b given by equation (5). Forgiving losses between sessions, and permitting subjects to begin anew at a subsequent session, is arguably a laboratory idealization of experience in the national economy. Recent studies have reported that only about 3% of publicly held companies in Chapter 11 bankruptcy are liquidated within 5 years (Alderson and Betker, 1999; Eberhart, Altman, and Aggarwal, 1999; Hotchkiss, 1995) ; others have debts forgiven and continue operating.
Bidding in the Auctions: Group vs. Individual Behavior
Subjects in group treatments were informed that they were free to use their signal sheets in any way that they wished. Signals appeared to be freely shared within groups with 5 signals; some put their sheets together with tape or staples, and marked the low and high signals in each period. Others called out their signals for one member to record on one of the signal sheets. Groups engaged in much discussion of how to proceed, often mapping out several periods with their decision strategy prior to entering a bid in the first practice period. All groups used at least one calculator. Ex post examination of the written-on sheets, revealed that many groups averaged their signals. One group even brought a laptop on the 3rd day and used a spreadsheet model. All of the groups appeared peer-oriented. Upon debriefing, groups commented on how important it was for them to "achieve consensus" before entering a bid.
Inspection of data from the experiment indicates that both individuals and groups are very subject to the winner's curse when they are inexperienced. High rates of incidence of losses from the winner's curse with inexperienced subjects can swamp experimental treatment effects. The more interesting data are for experienced subjects. Tables 1-3 report data from the final day's bidding in each treatment.
The salient monetary rewards earned by subjects on the final day are reported in Table 1 , as are the experimental/U.S. dollar exchange rates used in the treatments. There were large differences between the lowest and highest earnings in all treatments. Non-bankrupt bidder averages are shown in the third column of Table 1 
Comparison of the Performance of Individual and Group Bidders
First consider the parameter estimates reported in Table 2 for all bidders. The first two columns of Table = 1) and signal sample size 1 (i.e. S = 1) is compared with a treatment using group bidders (i.e. G = 5) and signal sample size 5 (i.e. S = 5). Comparison of the estimated intercept and slope deviations from the values in equation (5) provides a measure of the departure from rational bidding by the bidders in an experiment. Equation (5) The third and fourth columns of Table 2 compare the performance of bidders in individual and group bidding treatments with a market size of 7. The intercept deviation for individual bidders with signal sample size of 1 (treatment (1, 1, 7)) is +371 whereas it is +268 for groups with signal sample size of 5. In this comparison, group bidders with more information are nominally farther from winner's curse bidding than are individuals with less information about the value of the auctioned item although neither deviation is significantly different from 0 (because of large standard errors).
Comparison of the Performance of Individual and Group Winners
It is germane to understanding the effects of bidding entity composition and item value information on the rationality of bidding behavior to analyze all bid data, as we do in Table 2 . But it is more central to understanding the incidence of the winner's curse to analyze the winning bids, as we do in Table 3 .
Both individual and group high bidders with single signals do not deviate significantly from minimally-rational bidding in either three bidder or seven bidder markets, as is clear from inspecting the results reported in Table 3 for treatments (1,1,3), (5,1,3), (1,1,7), and (5,1,7). Comparisons involving multiple signals tell a different story.
The first two columns of Table 3 report the central comparison for winning bidders in market size 3. The reported intercept deviation of +31 in the (1,1,3) treatment is positive but not significant. In contrast, the intercept deviation for treatment (5,5,3) is +544, and significantly positive. In this specific way, group high bidders with more information are less rational than individual high bidders in three bidder markets. The direction of the market size 7 comparison is the same; while the intercept deviation in treatment (1,1,7) is +284 it is much larger and significantly positive, at +1411, in treatment (5,5,7).
Therefore group high bidders with more information are less rational than individual high bidders with less information in seven bidder markets as well as three bidder markets.
The intercept deviations for group high bidders with single signals are positive for the three bidder (treatment (5,1,3)) and negative for the seven bidder (treatment (5,1,7)) markets. Individual high bidders with more information are rational in three bidder markets (treatment (1,5,3)) but not in seven bidder markets (treatment (1,5,7)); in the latter treatment the intercept deviation is +713 and, not surprisingly, significantly positive.
The range deviation estimates reported in the third row of Table 3 provide insight into how more information about auctioned item values (signal sample size of 5 rather than 1) leads winning bidders into irrational bidding strategies, especially when they bid as groups rather than individuals. The right hand side of equation (2) shows the minimum rational discount (MRD) from the naïve estimate of item value that is needed to avoid the winner's curse when the bidder has a single signal. The size of the MRD is an increasing function of market size N. As has been emphasized in previous literature (e.g., Kagel and Levin, 1986; Cox, Dinkin, and Swarthout, 2001) , many individual bidders with single value signals make too small signal discounts when N > 3. The right hand side of the first line of equation (3) bidders. Individual bidders with signal sample size 5 deviate significantly from minimally-rational bidding in seven bidder markets but not in three bidder markets, whereas group bidders deviate significantly from minimally-rational bidding in both the smaller and larger markets.
Summary and Conclusions
Are group winning bidders more or less subject to the winner's curse than individual high bidders in common value auctions? Our research suggests that the answer depends upon the defining characteristics of groups. If groups are characterized as decision-making entities consisting of individuals with distinct information, then comparison of winning bids from treatments involving groups, with signal sample size of 5, with treatments involving individuals, with signal sample size of 1, supports the conclusion that groups are less rational than individuals. On the other hand, if groups consist of individuals that have common information then comparison of high bids from treatments involving groups, with signal sample size of 1, with treatments involving individuals, with signal sample size of 1, does not support a conclusion that groups are less or more rational than individuals.
We think that it is a surprising feature of our results that more information about the value of the auctioned item causes both individuals and groups to deviate further from rational bidding and that this "curse of information" is worse for groups than for individuals. Our experiment data do not support analysis that has appeared in previous literature. Hoffman, et al. (1991) * Significantly greater than the minimum rational discount by a one-tailed 5% t-test. # Significantly different from the theoretical value by a two-tailed 5% t-test. Standard errors are in parentheses.
